An indifference approach to cost of capital constraints: KVA and beyond

London-Paris workshop in Math Finance, London, 21-22/09/2017


Damiano Brigo

Dept. of Mathematics, Imperial College London Research page http://wwwf.imperial.ac.uk/~dbrigo

Joint work with co-authors listed in the references and especially Marco Francischello and Andrea Pallavicini

Full paper https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.05319

Presentation based on Book (working on 2nd Edition)



Prof. Damiano Brigo ((c) 2004-2017)

Indifference & cost of capital: KVA?

London-Paris Bachelier 2017 2

A Little History: CVA and DVA can be sizeable. Citigroup:

1Q 2009: "Revenues also included [...] a net 2.5\$ billion positive Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) on derivative positions, excluding monolines, mainly due to the widening of Citi's CDS spreads" (DVA)

CVA mark to market losses: BIS

"During the financial crisis, however, roughly two-thirds of losses attributed to counterparty credit risk were due to CVA losses and only about one-third were due to actual defaults."

Collateral not always effective as a guarantee: B. et al [19]


For trades subject to strong contagion at default of the counterparty, like CDS, collateral can leave a sizeable CVA [Initial Margin?]

FVA can be sizeable too. JP Morgan:

Wall St Journal, Jan 14, 2014: '[...] So what is a funding valuation adjustment, (FVA) and why did it cost J.P. Morgan Chase \$1.5 billion?'

Prof. Damiano Brigo ((c) 2004-2017)

Valuation adj.: default, collateral and funding flows



→ ∃ → < ∃ →</p>

< 17 ▶

Nonlinear valuation

$$(*) \quad V_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\underbrace{\Pi(t, T \land \tau)}_{\textit{Basic cash flows collateral carry}} + \underbrace{\gamma(t)}_{\textit{closeout cashflows}} + \underbrace{1_{\{\tau < T\}} D(t, \tau) \theta_{\tau}}_{\textit{funding carry}} + \underbrace{\varphi(t)}_{\textit{funding carry}} \right]$$

Can we interpret:


 $\mathbb{E}_t \big[\Pi + \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau < T\}} D(t, \tau) \theta \big] : \text{ RiskFree Price + DVA - CVA?} \\ \mathbb{E}_t \big[\gamma + \varphi \big] : \text{ Funding adjustment ColVA+FVA?}$

Not really. $V_t = F_t + H_t + C_t$ (re-hypo) $\Rightarrow \varphi$ term depends on future F = V - H - C to distinguish $f^+ \& f^-$, & the closeout depends on future *V* too. All terms depend on *V* (all risks), no neat separation.

Nonlinear Equation! (FBSDE, SL-PDE)

$$\mathbf{V}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \big[\, \Pi + \gamma(t, \, \mathbf{V}) + \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau < T\}} \mathbf{D}(t, \tau) \theta_\tau(\, \mathbf{V}) + \varphi(t, \, \mathbf{V}) \, \big]$$

э.



FVA(FCA and FBA) eplained by the costs & benefits bank faces in borrowing/lending externally to service trade ($\mathbb{E}\psi$)

Replication approach stretched (\mathbb{E} under \mathbb{Q}) beyond its limits? In the academic literature, see for example B. et al (2011-2017) [79, 80, 78, 36, 24, 25] & papers by Capponi, Crepey and others.

Prof. Damiano Brigo ((c) 2004-2017)

Kapital Valuation Adj? This talk in a nutshell

Strengthening of capital requirements induced banks to consider charging a so called capital valuation adjustment (KVA) to clients

Initial attempt to embed capital costs in "replication" framework as above, adding "capital account". Quite dubious (already for FVA...).

A more sensible approach might be relating costs of capital to ex-ante risk-adjusted target performance of the bank, for example ex ante RAROC = Expected P&L / VaR. How would this work?

When starting new trade with client, this generates new risk VaR.

This reduces RAROC. The improved P&L from the new trade may not be enough to compensate the new risk.

To keep target as before bank needs charge a profit margin.

(CVA is subject to capital: KVA on CVA? Additive? Nonlinear again?)

Prof. Damiano Brigo ((c) 2004-2017)

Capital costs: setting and previous literature I

Previous Literature: initial KVA in Green et al [112] relies on replication argument similar to our setting above for C/D/FVA. Unsatisfactory since it is not derived from first principles. Struggles with constraints and objectives defined under the real world measure \mathbb{P} .

Albanese et al [99] do not assume a replication argument but still postulate a form for KVA instead of deriving it from financial considerations. Their KVA doesn't depend explicitly on the regulatory constraints that motivated the KVA introduction in the first place.

Prampolini & Morini [116] assume definition of KVA & discuss how it interacts with CVA. KVA \approx analogous of CVA for unhedgable trades.

We adopt an indifference pricing approach, which is similar in spirit to what has been done for example for FVA in Duffie et al [100].

э

A first example based on RAROC I

One period model. Bank is endowed with some cash C_0 , and there is a liquid arbitrage-free market, with *d* securities with vector prices S_0 (deterministic) at t = 0 and S_1 (random) at t = 1.

A strategy on the liquid market is $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d$.

Bank borrows & lends money at spread λ over the risk-free rate *r*. This is for computational convenience, easily generalized to different λ 's.

Aside from liquid market, bank consider a OTC trade with payoff qY (q amount of product, Y product payoff) with a counterparty.

Counterparty interested in *buying* from the bank q units of payoff Y and they ask the bank for a quote on this product.

Problem: what is the price P(q) that the bank is willing to make to the counterparty for the contract with pay-off Y.

Prof. Damiano Brigo ((c) 2004-2017)

A first example based on RAROC II

In this initial example we use RAROC (Sironi et al [118]) to assess the value of a contract for a bank.

Ex-ante RAROC = $\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}$ [Portfolio P&L]/VaR[Portfolio]

Notation: **From now on** $\mathbb{E} = \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}}$.

Evaluate RAROC of portfolio without the product qY and RAROC of our portfolio including the product, and choose price P(q) so that the RAROC stays the same.

In other words our bank will be *indifferent* wrt entering the deal.

э.

A first example based on RAROC III

To proceed more in detail, for our chosen strategy θ we have:

Assets =
$$(\theta^T S_1)^+ + (qY)^+ + (C_0 - \theta^T S_0 + P(q))^+ (1 + r + \lambda^B);$$

Liabilities =
$$(\theta^T S_1)^- + (qY)^- + (C_0 - \theta^T S_0 + P(q))^- (1 + r + \lambda^B).$$

For convenience define the equity at time 1 of the bank as:

$$\begin{aligned} X(\theta, q) &= \textit{Assets} - \textit{Liabilities} \\ &= qY + \theta^T (S_1 - S_0(1 + r + \lambda)) + (C_0 + P(q))(1 + r + \lambda^B). \end{aligned}$$

Assume VaR is proportional to the standard deviation:

$$RAROC(\theta, q) = \frac{\mathbb{E}[X(\theta, q)] - C_0}{m\sqrt{Var[X(\theta, q)]}}.$$
(1)

A first example based on RAROC IV

Find P(q) s.t. $RAROC(\theta, 0) = RAROC(\theta', q)$, where θ' is strategy that the bank chooses in the case when it also trades the new product.

 θ' in principle different from θ , possibly includes hedge of qY and will need to change from θ to take into account capital constraints.

In this first example we assume θ is not changed. We assume the new product contains only unhedgeable risks, independent from other products, and that *there are no capital constraints* impacting θ . Then we have to solve

$$RAROC(\theta, 0) = RAROC(\theta, q).$$

Under our assumption of independence between Y and S_1 , with straightforward calculations and expanding for small q we obtain

$$P(q) \simeq \frac{1}{1+r+\lambda} \left(-q\mathbb{E}[Y] + RAROC(\theta, 0) \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{mq^2 Var[Y]}{\sqrt{Var[X(\theta, 0)]}} \right)_{\text{sc}} \right)$$

A first example based on RAROC V

$$P(q) \simeq \frac{1}{1+r+\lambda} \left(-q\mathbb{E}[Y] + RAROC(\theta, 0) \left(\frac{1}{2} \frac{mq^2 Var[Y]}{\sqrt{Var[X(\theta, 0)]}} \right) \right)$$

where we see that acceptable price is the discounted expectation of the cash flows due to our new product plus an adjustment (KVA?) proportional to the variance of the new product and the $RAROC(\theta, 0)$.

In the next part we are going to address the issues of the choice of θ , the hedging and also the presence of capital constraints impacting θ .

・ ロ ト ・ 同 ト ・ 目 ト ・ 目 ト

The general linear case (whole bank view) I

We now look again at an indifference price but

i) we address how to choose the bank's strategy on the liquid market (optimisation approach);

ii) inlcude regulatory capital constraints

On i) bank chooses θ to maximise value. Admissible set $\Theta(q) \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$

$$\widetilde{\nu}(q) = \sup_{\theta \in \Theta(q)} \mathbb{E} \left[X(\theta, q) \right].$$
 (2)

We focus on regulatory capital constraints that can be expressed as constraints on the Expected Shortfall (ES) or Value at Risk (V@R).

3

The general linear case (whole bank view) II

For our purposes we approximate capital constraints with:

$$\Theta(\boldsymbol{q}) = \left\{ \boldsymbol{\theta} \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid \boldsymbol{C}_0 = \nu \sqrt{\boldsymbol{\theta}^T \boldsymbol{A} \boldsymbol{\theta} + 2\boldsymbol{q} \boldsymbol{\theta}^T \boldsymbol{b} + \sigma_Y^2 \boldsymbol{q}^2} \right\}, \quad (3)$$

where σ_Y^2 is the variance of the payoff *Y*, and

$$Cov\left[\left(\begin{array}{c}S_1\\Y\end{array}\right)\right]=\left(\begin{array}{c}A&b\\b^T&\sigma_Y^2\end{array}\right).$$

In practice we are computing the capital constraint as an ES or V@R limit while approximating ES or V@R with a multiple ν of the standard deviation of the distribution of $X(\theta, q)$. Equivalently we are approximating the distribution of $X(\theta, q)$ with a distribution such that its ES or V@R is a multiple ν of its standard deviation.

3

• □ ▶ • @ ▶ • ■ ▶ • ■ ▶ •

The general linear case (whole bank view) III

We are supposing that the capital constraint is binding, or that is optimal for the bank to have the minimum amount of capital required.

Note: here endowment C_0 plays also role of capital of the bank: we are optimising the whole portfolio of the bank over one period.

Now, similarly to what we did in the first example, we look for P(q) such that the bank is *indifferent* with respect to enter the contract.

$$\widetilde{v}(0) = \widetilde{v}(q).$$

The treatment of the maximisation problem (2) $\widetilde{v}(q) = \sup_{\theta \in \Theta(q)} \mathbb{E} [X(\theta, q)]$ is classic (see for example [103, 108]).

3

The general linear case (whole bank view) IV

Main result for whole-bank view. Consider, for a fixed q, the problem of finding P such that

 $\widetilde{v}(q) = \widetilde{v}(0),$

$$\widetilde{\nu}(q) = \sup_{\theta \in \Theta(q)} \mathbb{E} \left[qY + \theta^T (S_1 - S_0(1 + r + \lambda)) + (C_0 + P(q))(1 + r + \lambda) \right]$$

$$\Theta(q) = \left\{ \theta \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid C_0 = \nu \sqrt{\theta^T A \theta + 2q \theta^T b + \sigma_Y^2 q^2} \right\}.$$
(4)
Set $\widehat{\mu} = (S_1 - S_0(1 + r + \lambda)), \ \mu = \mathbb{E}[(S_1 - S_0(1 + r + \lambda))].$

э.

• □ ▶ • @ ▶ • ■ ▶ • ■ ▶ •

The general linear case (whole bank view) V

The indifference Equation has a solution and is given by

$$\mathcal{P}(q) = rac{1}{1+r+\lambda} \left(-q\mathbb{E}[Y] + rac{1}{2} \left(rac{1}{\chi(0)} - rac{1}{\chi(q)}
ight) \mu^T \mathcal{A}^{-1} \mu + q b^T \mathcal{A}^{-1} \mu
ight),$$

where $\chi(q)$ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the problem (4) whose explicit expression is known (see full paper). Moreover if the deal is small compared to the bank's portfolio (i.e. *q* is small) we have the following ($D^{\lambda} = 1/(1 + r + \lambda)$):

$$\mathcal{P}(q) \simeq \mathcal{D}^{\lambda}\left(-q\mathbb{E}[Y] + \left(rac{(\sigma_Y^2 - b^T \mathcal{A}^{-1}b)q^2
u}{C_0}
ight)rac{\sqrt{\mu^T \mathcal{A}^{-1}\mu}}{2} + qb^T \mathcal{A}^{-1}\mu
ight)$$

・ ロ ト ・ 同 ト ・ 目 ト ・ 目 ト

The general linear case (whole bank view) VI

$$\mathcal{P}(\boldsymbol{q})\simeq \mathcal{D}^{\lambda}\left(-\boldsymbol{q}\mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{Y}]+\left(rac{(\sigma_{Y}^{2}-b^{T}\mathcal{A}^{-1}b)\boldsymbol{q}^{2}
u}{C_{0}}
ight)rac{\sqrt{\mu^{T}\mathcal{A}^{-1}\mu}}{2}+\boldsymbol{q}b^{T}\mathcal{A}^{-1}\mu
ight)$$

The price that would make the bank break even is approximated by the sum of three terms:

- a term which is minus the expectation of the payoff under \mathbb{P} ;
- a correction due to the presence of the capital constraint (KVA?);
- and a term that represents the expected excess return of the hedging portfolio, i.e. the difference between the expected value of the hedging portfolio at time 1 and its price at time 0 accrued at 1 + r + λ.

3

• □ ▶ • @ ▶ • ■ ▶ • ■ ▶ •

The general linear case (whole bank view) VII

Lastly, in the spirit of the previous example, introduce RAROC. Our expected P&L, associated with the best strategy, is:

$$\widetilde{\boldsymbol{\nu}}(\boldsymbol{0}) - \boldsymbol{C}_{0} = \left(\frac{\mu^{T}\boldsymbol{A}^{-1}}{2\chi(\boldsymbol{0})}\right)\mu + \boldsymbol{C}_{0}(\boldsymbol{r}+\lambda) = \sqrt{\mu\boldsymbol{A}^{-1}\mu}\frac{\boldsymbol{C}_{0}}{\nu} + \boldsymbol{C}_{0}(\boldsymbol{r}+\lambda)$$

To simplify our formulae we choose the same ES metric we used as capital constraint as denominator for our RAROC. Hence we have that:

$$RAROC(\bar{\theta},0) = \frac{\sqrt{\mu A^{-1} \mu} \frac{C_0}{\nu} + C_0(r+\lambda)}{C_0} = \frac{\sqrt{\mu A^{-1} \mu}}{\nu} + r + \lambda.$$

Notation: define RAROC = $h := \sqrt{\mu A^{-1} \mu} / \nu + r + \lambda$ and obtain

$$P(q) \simeq D^{\lambda} \left(-q\mathbb{E}[Y] + rac{1}{2} \left(rac{(\sigma_Y^2 - b^T A^{-1} b)q^2 \nu^2}{C_0}
ight) (h - r - \lambda) + q b^T A^{-1} \mu$$

A (10) A (10)

The general linear case (whole bank view) VIII

$${\sf P}(q)\simeq$$

$$D^{\lambda}\left(-q\mathbb{E}[Y]+\left[\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{(\sigma_{Y}^{2}-b^{T}A^{-1}b)q^{2}\nu^{2}}{C_{0}}\right)(h-r-\lambda)\right]+qb^{T}A^{-1}\mu\right)$$

with $h = \text{RAROC}(\tilde{\theta}, 0)$. This formula clearly highlights the adjustment due to capital constraint that needs to be made so that the bank can break even.

< 回 > < 回 > < 回 >

The full nonlinear case: Shareholders I

While in the previous section we took the whole bank perspective, now we analyse how capital constraints play a role in the shareholder's valuation of a deal.

Shareholder's objective function is different from the whole-bank one, since in case of default (negative equity at time 1 in our model) they have limited liability. This means that the best strategy for a shareholder solves the following optimisation problem:

$$m{v}(m{q}) = \sup_{ heta \in \Theta(m{q})} \mathbb{E}\left[(m{X}(heta,m{q}))^+
ight].$$

Note the positive part, that was missing in the whole-bank case.

Notation: bank's default is $D(\theta, q) = \{\omega \in \Omega \mid X(q, \theta) \le 0\}$ and $D^{c}(\theta, q)$ will denote the survival event.

< ロ > < 同 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ >

The full nonlinear case: Shareholders II

Again, we wish to determine the indifference price P(q) such that

$$v(q)=v(0).$$

In this part we focus on an approximated solution. We consider the following expansion for v(q) near 0

$$v(q) = v(0) + q rac{dv}{dq}|_{q=0} + q^2 rac{1}{2} rac{d^2 v}{d^2 q}|_{q=0} + o(q^2),$$

and, inspired from our linrarization based result for whole-bank, we look for price P which is a second degree polynomial in q such that

$$qrac{dv}{dq}|_{q=0}+q^2rac{1}{2}rac{d^2v}{d^2q}|_{q=0}=0.$$

3

The full nonlinear case: Shareholders III

This is a second order extension of what in the literature is usually called *marginal price*.

Here we focus on second order expansion since we want to understand the impact of capital constraints that in our model are represented by variance constraints & hence are second order in *q*.

< 回 > < 回 > < 回 >

The full nonlinear case: Shareholders IV

Main result nonlinear case - shareholders. Consider, for a fixed q, the problem of finding P such that

 $\boldsymbol{v}(\boldsymbol{q})=\boldsymbol{v}(\boldsymbol{0}),$

$$v(q) = \sup_{\theta \in \Theta(q)} \mathbb{E}\left[(qY + \theta^{T}(S_{1} - S_{0}/D^{\lambda}) + (C_{0} + P(q))/D^{\lambda})^{+} \right],$$

$$\Theta(q) = \left\{ \theta \in \mathbb{R}^{2} \mid C_{0} = \nu \sqrt{\theta^{T} A \theta + 2q \theta^{T} b + \sigma_{Y}^{2} q^{2}} \right\}.$$
(5)

The marginal (second order) indifference price is $P(q) \simeq$

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}\left[-\mathbf{1}_{\{D^c\}}Y\right] + \chi(\mathbf{0})2\theta^T b}{\mathbb{P}[D^c](\mathbf{1}+\mathbf{r}+\lambda)}q - \frac{\psi(\mathbf{0}) - \chi(\mathbf{0})2\sigma_Y^2 - 2\chi'(\mathbf{0})(2\theta^T b) + \mathfrak{C}(\mathbf{0})}{2(\mathbf{1}+\mathbf{r}+\lambda)}q^2,$$

э

・ ロ ト ・ 同 ト ・ 目 ト ・ 目 ト

The full nonlinear case: Shareholders V

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}\left[-\mathbf{1}_{\{D^c\}}Y\right]+\chi(\mathbf{0})2\theta^T b}{\mathbb{P}[D^c](\mathbf{1}+r+\lambda)}q-\frac{\psi(\mathbf{0})-\chi(\mathbf{0})2\sigma_Y^2-2\chi'(\mathbf{0})(2\theta^T b)+\mathfrak{C}(\mathbf{0})}{2(\mathbf{1}+r+\lambda)}q^2,$$

where if we indicate $D^{c}(h) = D^{c}(\theta^{*}, q + h)$ and $D^{c} = D^{c}(0)$, we have

$$\psi(0) = \lim_{h \to 0} \mathbb{E}\left[(Y + P(0)(1 + r + \lambda)) \frac{\mathbf{1}_{\{D^c(h)\}} - \mathbf{1}_{\{D^c\}}}{h} \right]$$
$$(0) = \sum_{i=1}^d \left(\sum_{j=1}^d \left(\chi(0) \frac{\partial^2 g}{\partial \theta_i \partial \theta_j} |_{q=0} - \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial \theta_i \partial \theta_j} |_{q=0} \right) \frac{\partial \theta_j^*}{\partial q} |_{q=0} \right) \frac{\partial \theta_i^*}{\partial q} |_{q=0},$$

Also in this case we can identify the different contributions to the price: the expected value term $\mathbb{E}\left[1_{\{D^c\}}Y\right]$, the two covariance bits $-q\chi(0)2\theta^T b$ and $-2q^2\chi'(0)(2\theta^T b)$, a convexity adjustment $(\psi(0) - \mathfrak{C}(0))q^2$ term and a capital part $-\chi(0)2\sigma_X^2$.

Prof. Damiano Brigo ((c) 2004-2017)

C

Optimizing the median: shareholder = whole bank I

Now we formulate our problem, including limited liability (shareholder), using the median instead of the expected value. On the use of quantiles function as objective functions for decision making and asset pricing see for example [110, 117].

We define a median $\mathcal{M}[X]$ of a real valued random variable X as

$$\mathcal{M}[X] := \inf_{m} \left\{ m \, | \, \mathbb{P}[X \leq m] \geq \frac{1}{2} \right\}$$

We make the reasonable assumption that there exist at least a $\bar{\theta} \in \Theta(q) = \left\{ \theta \in \mathbb{R}^2 \mid C_0 = \nu \sqrt{\theta^T A \theta + 2q \theta^T b + \sigma_Y^2 q^2} \right\}$ s.t.

$$qm_Y + \bar{\theta}^T(m_1 - S_0(1 + r + \lambda)) + (C_0 + P(q))(1 + r + \lambda) > 0,$$

3

Optimizing the median: shareholder = whole bank II

where $m_1 = \mathbb{E}[S_1]$ and $m_Y = \mathbb{E}[Y]$. This is equivalent to say that there exist an admissible portfolio choice such that on average the bank is solvent at time 1. Using the median as objective function we can then obtain the following.

A (10) A (10)

Optimizing the median: shareholder = whole bank III

Median result. Consider, for a fixed q, the shareholder problem of finding P such that

$$w(q) = w(0),$$

where

$$w(q) = \sup_{\theta \in \Theta(q)} \mathcal{M}\left[(qY + \theta^{T}(S_{1} - S_{0}/D^{\lambda}) + (C_{0} + P(q))/D^{\lambda})^{+} \right],$$

$$\Theta(q) = \left\{ \theta \in \mathbb{R}^{2} \mid C_{0} = \nu \sqrt{\theta^{T} A \theta + 2q \theta^{T} b + \sigma_{Y}^{2} q^{2}} \right\}.$$
(6)

This indifference problem has the same solution as the indifference problem in the whole-bank case with the mean (and the median)

$$P(q) = \frac{1}{1+r+\lambda} \left(q \mathbb{E}[-Y] + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{\chi(0)} - \frac{1}{\chi(q)} \right) \mu^T A^{-1} \mu + 2q b^T A^{-1} \mu \right)$$

A (10) A (10)

Optimizing the median: shareholder = whole bank IV

$$P(q) = \frac{1}{1+r+\lambda} \left(q \mathbb{E}[-Y] + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{\chi(0)} - \frac{1}{\chi(q)} \right) \mu^T A^{-1} \mu + 2q b^T A^{-1} \mu \right)$$

or small deal approximation:

$$P(q) \simeq D^{\lambda} \left(-q\mathbb{E}[Y] + \left(\frac{(\sigma_Y^2 - b^T A^{-1} b)q^2 \nu}{C_0} \right) \frac{\sqrt{\mu^T A^{-1} \mu}}{2} + q b^T A^{-1} \mu \right)$$

Hence we see that the median approach gives the same result as the linear one.

In practice this means that the use of the median as a performance indicator puts shareholders on the same ground as the whole bank, aligning their interests with the bond holders, also for what concerns the impact of capital requirements on the valuation process.

Prof. Damiano Brigo ((c) 2004-2017)

Indifference & cost of capital: KVA?

Disclaimer

All information relating to this presentation is solely for informative or illustrative purposes and shall not constitute an offer, investment advice, solicitation, or recommendation to engage in any transaction. While having prepared it carefully to provide accurate details, the lecturer refuses to make any representations or warranties regarding the express or implied information contained herein. This includes, but is not limited to, any implied warranty of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or accuracy, correctness, quality, completeness or timeliness of such information. The lecturer shall not be responsible or liable for any third partys use of any information contained herein under any circumstances, including, but not limited to, any errors or omissions.

・ ロ ト ・ 同 ト ・ 目 ト ・ 目 ト

References I

- [1] Assefa, S., Bielecki, T. R., Crèpey, S., and Jeanblanc, M. (2009). CVA computation for counterparty risk assessment in credit portfolios. In Recent advancements in theory and practice of credit derivatives, T. Bielecki, D. Brigo and F. Patras, eds, Bloomberg Press.
- [2] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
 "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards A Revised Framework Comprehensive Version" (2006),
 "Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector" (2009).
 Available at http://www.bis.org.
- [3] Bergman, Y. Z. (1995). Option Pricing with Differential Interest Rates. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer, 1995), pp. 475-500.

3

References II

- [4] Bianchetti, M. (2010). Two Curves, One Price. Risk, August 2010.
- [5] Bianchetti, M. (2012). The Zeeman Effect in Finance: Libor Spectroscopy and Basis Risk Management. Available at arXiv.com
- [6] Bielecki, T., and Crepey, S. (2010). Dynamic Hedging of Counterparty Exposure. Preprint.
- [7] Bielecki, T., Rutkowski, M. (2001). *Credit risk: Modeling, Valuation and Hedging.* Springer Verlag .
- [8] Biffis, E., Blake, D. P., Pitotti L., and Sun, A. (2011). The Cost of Counterparty Risk and Collateralization in Longevity Swaps. Available at SSRN.
- [9] Blanchet-Scalliet, C., and Patras, F. (2008). Counterparty Risk Valuation for CDS. Available at defaultrisk.com.

э.

References

References III

- [10] Blundell-Wignall, A., and P. Atkinson (2010). Thinking beyond Basel III. Necessary Solutions for Capital and Liquidity. OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, No. 2, Volume 2010, Issue 1, Pages 9–33.
 Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/58/45314422.pdf
- [11] Brigo, D. (2005). Market Models for CDS Options and Callable Floaters. Risk Magazine, January issue
- [12] D. Brigo, Constant Maturity CDS valuation with market models (2006). Risk Magazine, June issue. Earlier extended version available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=639022

-

References IV

- [13] D. Brigo (2012). Counterparty Risk Q&A: Credit VaR, CVA, DVA, Closeout, Netting, Collateral, Re-hypothecation, Wrong Way Risk, Basel, Funding, and Margin Lending. SSRN and arXiv
- [14] Brigo, D., and Alfonsi, A. (2005) Credit Default Swaps Calibration and Derivatives Pricing with the SSRD Stochastic Intensity Model, Finance and Stochastic, Vol. 9, N. 1.
- [15] Brigo, D., and Bakkar I. (2009). Accurate counterparty risk valuation for energy-commodities swaps. *Energy Risk*, March issue.
- [16] Brigo, D., and Buescu, C., and Morini, M. (2011). Impact of the first to default time on Bilateral CVA. Available at arXiv.org

э.

References V

- [17] Brigo, D., Buescu, C., Pallavicini, A., and Liu, Q. (2012).
 Illustrating a problem in the self-financing condition in two
 2010-2011 papers on funding, collateral and discounting. Available at ssrn.com and arXiv.org. Published in IJTAF.
- [18] Brigo, D., and Capponi, A. (2008). Bilateral counterparty risk valuation with stochastic dynamical models and application to CDSs. Working paper available at http://arxiv.org/abs/0812.3705. Short updated version in *Risk*, March 2010 issue.
- [19] Brigo, D., Capponi, A., and Pallavicini, A. (2011). Arbitrage-free bilateral counterparty risk valuation under collateralization and application to Credit Default Swaps. To appear in *Mathematical Finance*.

3

References VI

- Brigo, D., Capponi, A., Pallavicini, A., and Papatheodorou, V. (2011). Collateral Margining in Arbitrage-Free Counterparty Valuation Adjustment including Re-Hypotecation and Netting. Working paper available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1101.3926
- [21] Brigo, D., and Chourdakis, K. (2008). Counterparty Risk for Credit Default Swaps: Impact of spread volatility and default correlation. *International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance*, **12**, 7.
- [22] D. Brigo, L. Cousot (2006). A Comparison between the SSRD Model and the Market Model for CDS Options Pricing. International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance, Vol 9, n. 3

3

References VII

- [23] Brigo, D., and El–Bachir, N. (2010). An exact formula for default swaptions pricing in the SSRJD stochastic intensity model. Mathematical Finance, Volume 20, Issue 3, Pages 365-382.
- [24] Brigo, D., Francischello, M. and Pallavicini, A.: Analysis Of Nonlinear Valuation Equations Under Credit And Funding Effects. To appear in: Grbac, Z., Glau, K, Scherer, M., and Zagst, R. (Eds), *Challenges in Derivatives Markets – Fixed Income Modeling, Valuation Adjustments, Risk Management, and Regulation.* Springer series in Mathematics and Statistics, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg. Preprint version available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1506.00686 or SSRN.com

・ ロ ト ・ 同 ト ・ 目 ト ・ 目 ト

References VIII

- [25] D. Brigo, Q. Liu, A. Pallavicini, and D. Sloth. Nonlinear valuation under collateral, credit risk and funding costs: A numerical case study extending Black–Scholes. In: P. Veronesi, Editor, *Handbook* of *Fixed-Income Securities*, Wiley, 2016. Preprint available at ssrn and arXiv, 2014.
- [26] Brigo, D., and Masetti, M. (2005). Risk Neutral Pricing of Counterparty Risk. In Counterparty Credit Risk Modelling: Risk Management, Pricing and Regulation, *Risk Books*, Pykhtin, M. editor, London.
- [27] Brigo, D., Mercurio, F. (2001). Interest Rate Models: Theory and Practice with Smile, Inflation and Credit, Second Edition 2006, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg.

References IX

- [28] Brigo, D., Morini, M. (2006) Structural credit calibration, *Risk*, April issue.
- [29] Brigo, D., and Morini, M. (2010). Dangers of Bilateral Counterparty Risk: the fundamental impact of closeout conventions. Preprint available at ssrn.com or at arxiv.org.
- [30] Brigo, D., and Morini, M. (2010). Rethinking Counterparty Default, Credit flux, Vol 114, pages 18–19
- [31] Brigo D., Morini M., and Tarenghi M. (2011). Equity Return Swap valuation under Counterparty Risk. In: Bielecki, Brigo and Patras (Editors), Credit Risk Frontiers: Sub- prime crisis, Pricing and Hedging, CVA, MBS, Ratings and Liquidity, Wiley, pp 457–484

3

- [32] Brigo, D., and Nordio, C. (2010). Liquidity Adjusted Market Risk Measures with Random Holding Period. Available at SSRN.com, arXiv.org, and sent to BIS, Basel.
- [33] Brigo, D., and Pallavicini, A. (2007). Counterparty Risk under Correlation between Default and Interest Rates. In: Miller, J., Edelman, D., and Appleby, J. (Editors), Numercial Methods for Finance, Chapman Hall.
- [34] D. Brigo, A. Pallavicini (2008). Counterparty Risk and Contingent CDS under correlation, Risk Magazine, February issue.
- [35] Brigo, D., and Pallavicini, A. (2014). CCP Cleared or Bilateral CSA Trades with Initial/Variation Margins under credit, funding and wrong-way risks: A Unified Valuation Approach. SSRN.com and arXiv.org

-

References XI

- [36] Brigo, D. and A. Pallavicini (2014). Nonlinear consistent valuation of CCP cleared or CSA bilateral trades with initial margins under credit, funding and wrong-way risks. Journal of Financial Engineering 1 (1), 1-60.
- [37] Brigo, D., Pallavicini, A., and Papatheodorou, V. (2011).
 Arbitrage-free valuation of bilateral counterparty risk for interest-rate products: impact of volatilities and correlations, International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance, 14 (6), pp 773–802
- [38] Brigo, D., Pallavicini, A., and Torresetti, R. (2010). Credit Models and the Crisis: A journey into CDOs, Copulas, Correlations and Dynamic Models. Wiley, Chichester.

3

References XII

[39] Brigo, D. and Tarenghi, M. (2004). Credit Default Swap Calibration and Equity Swap Valuation under Counterparty risk with a Tractable Structural Model. Working Paper, available at www.damianobrigo.it/cdsstructural.pdf. Reduced version in Proceedings of the FEA 2004 Conference at MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, November 8-10 and in Proceedings of the Counterparty Credit Risk 2005 C.R.E.D.I.T. conference, Venice, Sept 22-23, Vol 1.

[40] Brigo, D. and Tarenghi, M. (2005). Credit Default Swap Calibration and Counterparty Risk Valuation with a Scenario based First Passage Model. Working Paper, available at www.damianobrigo.it/cdsscenario1p.pdf Also in: Proceedings of the Counterparty Credit Risk 2005 C.R.E.D.I.T. conference, Venice, Sept 22-23, Vol 1.

< ロ > < 同 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < 回 > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ >

References XIII

- [41] Burgard, C., Kjaer, M. (2010). PDE Representations of Options with Bilateral Counterparty Risk and Funding Costs Available at ssrn.com.
- [42] Burgard, C., Kjaer, M. (2011). In the Balance Available at ssrn.com.
- [43] Canabarro, E., and Duffie, D.(2004). Measuring and Marking Counterparty Risk. In Proceedings of the Counterparty Credit Risk 2005 C.R.E.D.I.T. conference, Venice, Sept 22–23, Vol 1.
- [44] Canabarro, E., Picoult, E., and Wilde, T. (2005). Counterparty Risk. *Energy Risk*, May issue.
- [45] Castagna, A. (2011). Funding, Liquidity, Credit and Counterparty Risk: Links and Implications, Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1855028

3

References XIV

- [46] G. Cesari, J. Aquilina, N. Charpillon, Z. Filipovic, G. Lee and I. Manda (2010). Modelling, Pricing, and Hedging Counterparty Credit Exposure: A Technical Guide, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg.
- [47] Cherubini, U. (2005). Counterparty Risk in Derivatives and Collateral Policies: The Replicating Portfolio Approach. In: ALM of Financial Institutions (Editor: Tilman, L.), Institutional Investor Books.
- [48] Collin-Dufresne, P., Goldstein, R., and Hugonnier, J. (2002). A general formula for pricing defaultable securities. Econometrica 72: 1377-1407.
- [49] Crépey, S. (2011). A BSDE approach to counterparty risk under funding constraints. Available at

grozny.maths.univ-evry.fr/pages_perso/crepey

э.

イロト 不得 トイヨト イヨト

References XV

- [50] Crépey S., Gerboud, R., Grbac, Z., Ngor, N. (2012a). Counterparty Risk and Funding: The Four Wings of the TVA. Available at arxiv.org.
- [51] Crouhy M., Galai, D., and Mark, R. (2000). A comparative analysis of current credit risk models. *Journal of Banking and Finance* 24, 59-117
- [52] Danziger, J. (2010). Pricing and Hedging Self Counterparty Risk. Presented at the conference "Global Derivatives", Paris, May 18, 2010.
- [53] Duffie, D., and Huang, M. (1996). Swap Rates and Credit Quality. Journal of Finance 51, 921–950.

э.

References XVI

- [54] Duffie, D., and Zhu H. (2010). Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk? Working Paper, Stanford University.
- [55] Ehlers, P. and Schoenbucher, P. (2006). The Influence of FX Risk on Credit Spreads, ETH working paper, available at defaultrisk.com
- [56] Fries, C. (2010). Discounting Revisited: Valuation Under Funding, Counterparty Risk and Collateralization. Available at SSRN.com
- [57] Fujii, M., Shimada, Y., and Takahashi, A. (2010). Collateral Posting and Choice of Collateral Currency. Available at ssrn.com.
- [58] J. Gregory (2009). "Being two faced over counterparty credit risk", *Risk Magazine* 22 (2), pages 86-90.

э.

References XVII

[59] J. Gregory (2010). Counterparty Credit Risk: The New Challenge for Global Financial Markets, Wiley, Chichester.

[60] Hull, J., White, A. (2012). The FVA debate Risk Magazine, 8

[61] ISDA. "Credit Support Annex" (1992), 'Guidelines for Collateral Practitioners" (1998), "Credit Support Protocol" (2002), "Close-Out Amount Protocol" (2009), "Margin Survey" (2010), "Market Review of OTC Derivative Bilateral Collateralization Practices" (2010). Available at http://www.isda.org.

[62] Jamshidian, F. (2002). Valuation of credit default swap and swaptions, FINANCE AND STOCHASTICS, 8, pp 343–371

[63] Jones, E. P., Mason, S.P., and Rosenfeld, E. (1984). Contingent Claims Analysis of Corporate Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation. *Journal of Finance* 39, 611-625

References XVIII

- [64] Jorion, P. (2007). Value at Risk, 3-d edition, McGraw Hill.
- [65] Keenan, J. (2009). Spotlight on exposure. Risk October issue.
- [66] Kenyon, C. (2010). Completing CVA and Liquidity: Firm-Level Positions and Collateralized Trades. Available at arXiv.org.
- [67] McNeil, A. J., Frey, R., and P. Embrechts (2005). Quantitative Risk Management: Concepts, Techniques, and Tools, Princeton university press.
- [68] Leung, S.Y., and Kwok, Y. K. (2005). Credit Default Swap Valuation with Counterparty Risk. The Kyoto Economic Review 74 (1), 25–45.

э.

References XIX

- [69] Lipton A, Sepp A, Credit value adjustment for credit default swaps via the structural default model, The Journal of Credit Risk, 2009, Vol:5, Pages:123-146
- [70] Lo, C. F., Lee H.C. and Hui, C.H. (2003). A Simple Approach for Pricing Barrier Options with Time-Dependent Parameters. *Quantitative Finance* 3, 98-107
- [71] Merton R. (1974) On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates. *The Journal of Finance* 29, 449-470.
- [72] Moreni, N. and Pallavicini, A. (2010). Parsimonious HJM Modelling for Multiple Yield-Curve Dynamics. Accepted for publication in Quantitative Finance.

3

References XX

- [73] Moreni, N. and Pallavicini, A. (2012). Parsimonious Multi-Curve HJM Modelling with Stochastic Volatility, in: Bianchetti and Morini (Editors), Interest Rate Modelling After The Financial Crisis, Risk Books.
- [74] Morini, M. (2011). Understanding and Managing Model Risk. Wiley.
- [75] Morini, M. and Brigo, D. (2011). No-Armageddon Measure for Arbitrage-Free Pricing of Index Options in a Credit Crisis, Mathematical Finance, 21 (4), pp 573–593
- [76] Morini, M. and Prampolini, A. (2011). Risky Funding: A Unified Framework for Counterparty and Liquidity Charges, Risk Magazine, March 2011 issue.

3

References XXI

- [77] Pallavicini, A. (2010). Modelling Wrong-Way Risk for Interest-Rate Products. Presented at the conference "6th Fixed Income Conference", Madrid, 23-24 September 2010.
- [78] A. Pallavicini, and D. Brigo (2013). Interest-Rate Modelling in Collateralized Markets: Multiple curves, credit-liquidity effects, CCPs. SSRN.com and arXiv.org
- [79] Pallavicini, A., Perini, D., and Brigo, D. (2011). Funding Valuation Adjustment consistent with CVA and DVA, wrong way risk, collateral, netting and re-hypotecation. Available at SSRN.com and arXiv.org

-

References XXII

- [80] Pallavicini, A., Perini, D., and Brigo, D. (2012). Funding, Collateral and Hedging: uncovering the mechanics and the subtleties of funding valuation adjustments. Available at SSRN.com and arXiv.org
- [81] Parker E., and McGarry A. (2009) The ISDA Master Agreement and CSA: Close-Out Weaknesses Exposed in the Banking Crisis and Suggestions for Change. Butterworths Journal of International Banking Law, 1.
- [82] Picoult, E. (2005). Calculating and Hedging Exposure, Credit Value Adjustment and Economic Capital for Counterparty Credit Risk. In Counterparty Credit Risk Modelling (M. Pykhtin, ed.), Risk Books.

3

References XXIII

- [83] Piterbarg, V., (2010). Funding beyond discounting: collateral agreements and derivatives pricing. Risk Magazine, February 2010.
- [84] Pollack, Lisa (2012). Barclays visits the securitisation BISTRO. Financial Times Alphaville Blog, Posted by Lisa Pollack on Jan 17, 11:20.
- [85] Pollack, Lisa (2012b). The latest in regulation-induced innovation Part 2. Financial Times Alphaville Blog, Posted by Lisa Pollack on Apr 11 16:50.
- [86] Pollack, Lisa (2012c). Big banks seek regulatory capital trades. Financial Times Alphaville Blog, Posted by Lisa Pollack on April 29, 7:27 pm.

э.

References XXIV

- [87] Rosen, D., and Pykhtin, M. (2010). Pricing Counterparty Risk at the Trade Level and CVA Allocations. Journal of Credit Risk, vol. 6 (Winter 2010), pp. 3-38.
- [88] Sorensen, E.H., and Bollier, T. F. (1994). Pricing Swap Default Risk. *Financial Analysts Journal*, 50. 23–33.
- [89] Watt, M. (2011). Corporates fear CVA charge will make hedging too expensive. Risk Magazine, October issue.
- [90] Weeber, P., and Robson E. S. (2009) Market Practices for Settling Derivatives in Bankruptcy. ABI Journal, 9, 34–35, 76–78.
- [91] M. Brunnermeier and L. Pedersen. Market liquidity and funding liquidity. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 22 (6), 2009.

э.

References XXV

- [92] J. Eisenschmidt and J. Tapking. Liquidity risk premia in unsecured interbank money markets. *Working Paper Series European Central Bank*, 2009.
- [93] M. Fujii and A. Takahashi. Clean valuation framework for the usd silo. *Working Paper*, 2011a. URL ssrn.com.
- [94] M. Fujii and A. Takahashi. Collateralized cds and default dependence. *Working Paper*, 2011b. URL ssrn.com.
- [95] D. Heller and N. Vause. From turmoil to crisis: Dislocations in the fx swap market. *BIS Working Paper*, 373, 2012.
- [96] M. Henrard. The irony in the derivatives discounting part ii: The crisis. *ssrn*, 2009.

э.

References XXVI

- [97] A. Pallavicini and M. Tarenghi. Interest-rate modelling with multiple yield curves. 2010.
- [98] C. Pirrong. The economics of central clearing: Theory and practice. *ISDA Discussion Papers Series*, 2011.
- [99] C. Albanese, S. Caenazzo, and S. Crépey.
 - Capital valuation adjustment and funding valuation adjustment. 2016.
- [100] L. B. Andersen, D. Duffie, and Y. Song. Funding value adjustments. 2016.

References XXVII

[101] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards.

2006.

[102] Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Minimum capital requirements for market risk. 2016.

[103] J. H. Cochrane. Asset Pricing:(Revised Edition). Princeton university press, 2009.

[104] R. Cont and E. F. Schaanning. Fire sales, indirect contagion and systemic stress testing. 2017.

・ ロ ト ・ 同 ト ・ 目 ト ・ 目 ト

References XXVIII

[105] M. H. Davis.

Option pricing in incomplete markets.

Mathematics of derivative securities, 15:216–226, 1997.

[106] I. Erel, S. C. Myers, and J. A. Read.

A theory of risk capital.

Journal of Financial Economics, 118(3):620-635, 2015.

[107] L. Foldes.

Valuation and martingale properties of shadow prices: An exposition.

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 24(11):1641–1701, 2000.

・ ロ ト ・ 同 ト ・ 目 ト ・ 目 ト

References XXIX

[108] C. Fontana and M. Schweizer. Simplified mean-variance portfolio optimisation. Mathematics and Financial Economics, 6(2):125–152, 2012.

[109] K. A. Froot and J. C. Stein.

Risk management, capital budgeting, and capital structure policy for financial institutions: an integrated approach.

Journal of Financial Economics, 47(1):55-82, 1998.

[110] B. C. Giovannetti.

Asset pricing under quantile utility maximization. *Review of Financial Economics*, 22(4):169–179, 2013.

[111] M. B. Gordy.

A risk-factor model foundation for ratings-based bank capital rules. *Journal of financial intermediation*, 12(3):199–232, 2003.

< 回 > < 回 > < 回 > -

References XXX

- [112] A. Green, C. Kenyon, and C. Dennis. Kva: Capital valuation adjustment. 2014.
- [113] V. Henderson and D. Hobson. Utility indifference pricing-an overview. *Volume on Indifference Pricing*, 2004.
- [114] R. C. Merton and A. Perold. Theory of risk capital in financial firms. *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance*, 6(3):16–32, 1993.
- [115] F. Modigliani and M. H. Miller.

The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment.

The American economic review, pages 261–297, 1958.

- A TE N - A TE N

References XXXI

[116] A. Prampolini and M. Morini.

Derivatives hedging, capital and leverage. 2016.

[117] M. Rostek. Quantile maximization in decision theory. The Review of Economic Studies, 77(1):339–371, 2010.

[118] A. Sironi and A. Resti.

Risk management and shareholders' value in banking: from risk measurement models to capital allocation policies, volume 417. John Wiley & Sons, 2007.

A (10) A (10)

References XXXII

[119] S. M. Turnbull.

Capital allocation and risk performance measurement in a financial institution.

Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 9(5):325–357, 2000.

Prof. Damiano Brigo ((c) 2004-2017)

A (10) A (10)