

Exercises for all the project

1. Consider $A = \begin{pmatrix} 2 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 2 \end{pmatrix}$ and the corresponding replicator system

$$\dot{x}_i = x_i((Ax)_i - x \cdot Ax). \quad (*)$$

Determine the NE and ESS points of this system. Draw the indifference lines, and best response regions in the appropriate triangle Δ . Determine the singularity points of (*), and determine the eigenvalues at these singularities, and thus whether they are saddle points, attracting or repelling. Sketch the phase portrait of (*). You are allowed to use theorems in the lecture notes.

2. Consider the

$$\text{battle of the sexes game: } \begin{pmatrix} (2, 1) & (0, 0) \\ (0, 0) & (2, 7) \end{pmatrix}$$

(where we use the 2nd notation). Compute the NE, CCE and CE sets.

3. We say that two $m \times n$ bimatrix games (A, B) and (\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}) are *(linearly) equivalent*, $(A, B) \sim (\tilde{A}, \tilde{B})$, if there exist $c, d > 0$ and $c_1, \dots, c_n, d_1, \dots, d_m \in \mathbb{R}$ so that

$$\tilde{a}_{ij} = c \cdot a_{ij} + c_j \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{b}_{ij} = d \cdot b_{ij} + d_i \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, m \text{ and } j = 1, \dots, n.$$

Here we use the 2nd notation for bimatrix games. Show that if (A, B) and (\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}) are equivalent then

- (a) the replicator dynamics associated to (A, B) and to (\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}) are the same (or do you need $c = d$ for this?);
- (b) $\mathcal{BR}_A = \mathcal{BR}_{\tilde{A}}$, $\mathcal{BR}_B = \mathcal{BR}_{\tilde{B}}$ and the best response dynamics associated to (A, B) and to (\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}) are the same.
- (c) the NE, CE and CCE sets associated to (A, B) and to (\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}) are the same.
- (d) the Hart and Mas-Colell regret matching algorithms for these games give the same dynamics.
- (e) explain why the reinforcement learning algorithms from Section 6.1 of the lecture notes are not necessarily the same for the games (A, B) and to (\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}) .